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The paper examines empirically a subset of cognitive processes in trainee 
translators with the objective of gaining an insight into their decision-making. 
Specifically, we are interested in the nature and role of automated processing 
– above all, how pronounced it can be and how it influences the quality of de-
cisions. The paper’s objective is then to come up with an integrative view of 
the relationship between translatorial automaticity and cognitive automaticity 
in general, viz. that not associated with translation. This could help us better 
capture some of the characteristics of translator behaviour and supplement our 
understanding of translation competence. Results from experiments with 
trainees reported in the paper show no correlation between the two dimen-
sions of automated processing, and indicate that translatorial automaticity 
could be harder to override than its more general counterpart. 
Key words: interlingual translation; translation competence; processing in 
translation; dual-process theories; decision-making, translation and cognition, 
trainee translators. 
1. Introduction 
In their list of eight “essential features of the translation process (…) accounting for 
its complexity” Alves & Hurtado (2017: 537) single out “the existence of automa-
tized (uncontrolled) and non‐automatized (controlled) processes”. Some valuable 
work has already been done on that topic in Translation Studies (e.g. Tirkkonen-
Condit 2005; Carl & Dragsted 2012; Halverson 2015; Schaeffer et al. 2016), but 
the dynamics of fast/intuitive/effortless vs. slow/rational/effortful types of transla-
torial processing remain under-researched. The reasons are, in part, methodologi-
cal. There is the question of operationalisation, i.e of how to ensure the comparabil-





Translatorial and non-translatorial automaticity: An integrative account 
into both theoretical and empirical aspects of automaticity in translation is especial-
ly striking if we compare the body of work on translation with how much has been 
happening in other domains of decision making, economics being one salient case 
(e.g. Brocas & Carillo 2014). 
This paper aims to contribute to the research on processing in translation by 
bringing together a “cognitive-psychological” perspective on automaticity as it op-
erates within one language and a “translation” perspective. The question that we at-
tempt to answer is, first, about the nature and strength of translatorial and non-
translatorial automaticity, and second, about the relationship between the two 
types. The findings are discussed in light of the relevant translation research, with a 
special emphasis on implications for translator training. 
The article is structured as follows. First, we address the construct of automatici-
ty in cognition in general (Section 2.1). Next, we zoom in on automaticity in lan-
guage – with special attention to formulaicity and conventionalisation – and a link 
is drawn from automaticity as operating within a single language to automatic op-
erations evidenced in interlingual translation (Section 2.2). Finally, as a step to-
wards a more generalised account, the results of our study on translatorial and non-
translatorial automaticity are reported in Section 3. 
2. Automaticity in cognition, language, and translation 
2.1. Automaticity in cognition 
Scientific interest in automatic cognitive operations can be traced back at least as 
far back as James (1890), Bryan & Hatter (1899) and Jastrow (1906). Still, alt-
hough not scientifically contentious today, only a few decades ago, the premise that 
humans rely on both automatic and non-automatic cognitive processes was seen as 
“radical” and “much of psychology continued to assume that everything we decid-
ed and did was the result of intentional, conscious thought” (Bargh 2017: 28). 
Automatic and non-automatic processes are sometimes distinguished by draw-
ing on the following sets of features (Moors & De Houwer 2006): intention-
al/unintentional, goal dependent/goal independent, controlled/uncontrolled (or con-
trollable/uncontrollable), purely stimulus-driven/not purely stimulus-driven, con-
scious/unconscious, efficient/non-efficient, and fast/slow.1 Automatic processes 
                                                 
1 It should be mentioned, though, that the idea that any of these pairs of concepts are fully dichoto-
mous, or that pairs like intentional/unintentional, goal-dependent/goal independent, etc. overlap 
completely with the differentiation between automatic and non-automatic processes (whether in 
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would include reflexes and emergency reactions (blinking, removing a hand from 
the source of hotness), impulsive processes (lashing out in anger, compulsive 
thoughts) but also, importantly for translation investigations, processes that require 
intentional development (riding a bike, playing the piano) (Moors 2016: 264). 
Some further distinguishing properties of automatic and non-automatic modes of 
processing are proposed in Kahneman (2011: 80), who refers to the two modes as 
“System 1” and “System 2”, respectively: 
System 1 does not keep track of alternatives that it rejects, or even of the fact 
that there were alternatives. Conscious doubt is not in the repertoire of System 
1; it requires maintaining incompatible interpretations in mind at the same 
time, which demands mental effort. Uncertainty and doubt are the domain of 
System 2. 
References to (lack of) doubt, uncertainty, and attention to alternatives will be 
made later in this paper, since manifestations of these on our experimental tasks 
will be taken as indicators of (non-)automatic processing. 
Automaticity has been investigated as one mode of processing in what came to 
be known as “dual-process theories” (Wason & Evans 1975; Evans 1989; 2010; 
Stanovich 2011; Evans & Stanovich 2013). Dual-process theories postulate two 
“types”2 of processing: Type 1 – automatic, and Type 2 – non-automatic. However, 
they have not remained unchallenged (e.g. Cleeremans & Jiménez 2002; Osman 
2004; Gigerenzer 2011; Kruglanski & Gigerenzer 2011; Sorensen 2016). Some au-
thors advocate a less “discretised” formulation, a notable alternative being the 
Cognitive Continuum Theory (CCT) (Hammond 1996; cf. Brunswik 1956). The 
CCT: 
(…) explicitly rejects a dichotomous view of intuition and analysis. This di-
chotomy is replaced by a continuum of cognitive modes that has intuition and 
analysis at its end points. As such, cognition is viewed not as strictly rational 
or intuitive, but as often falling between the extremes, and thereby being qua-
                                                                                                                                       
translation or any other observable behaviour) has been challenged. For some alternative views see 
further below in the text. A similar note pertains to the sets of terms in footnote 2 where – addition-
ally – no full synonymy between the sets should be assumed. 
2 Whether these are optimally referred to as “types”, “modes”, or “systems” has been subject to dis-
cussion (cf. e.g. Evans & Stanovich 2013). Similarly, a range of labels has been in use for the re-
spective types, drawing on notions like “automatic”, “implicit”, “intuitive”, “heuristic”, “impul-
sive”, “experiential”, and “reflexive” for one of them, and “deliberative”, “explicit”, “rational”, “an-
alytic” and “reflective” for the other (cf. e.g. Epstein 1994; Strack & Deutsch 2004; Kahneman 
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si-rational. Quasi-rationality refers to the region of cognition between the po-
lar extremes of the continuum, and has properties of both intuition and analy-
sis (Dunwoody et al. 2000: 36). 
While the CCT has received empirical and theoretical support, notably in 
healthcare settings (Cader et al. 2005; Custers 2013; Parker-Tomlin et al. 2017), it 
still remains less extensively tested than dual-process theories. Dual-process theo-
ries have been successfully adopted across subfields of psychological science, like 
social cognition (Chaiken & Trope 1999; Smith & DeCoster 2000; Evans 2008), 
the psychology of learning (Reber 1993; Sun et al. 2005), aesthetics (Graf & 
Landwehr 2015; Mullennix et al. 2016), morality (Greene 2007; Brand 2016), or 
economics (Alós-Ferrer & Strack 2014; Brocas & Carrillo 2014). The differentia-
tion of Type 1 and Type 2 processing has also received empirical support from 
studies applying a variety of methodologies. These methodologies range from those 
applied in neuroscience, viz. fMRI and near-infrared spectroscopy (Goel 2007; 
Lieberman 2009; Tsujii & Watanabe 2009), to vignettes, or uncomplicated ques-
tion-answer formats designed to elicit evidence of cognitive operations. A typical 
instance of the latter is the instrument known as the Cognitive Reflection Test 
(Frederick 2005; see Section 3.3), which will be an important element of the ana-
lytical part of this study. 
2.1. Automaticity and language use: from one language to translation 
Automatic processes feature prominently in language use and the proposals dis-
cussed in this section rely on the concept or even use the term explicitly. The un-
derlying idea is that combinations of linguistic elements are not created in a con-
trolled and strategic manner for each communicative situation, but are stored and 
readily accessed as ready-made expressions. 
One influential line of research has been developed around the constructs of 
formulaicity and prefabrication, on the one hand, and novelty or compositionality, 
on the other. The notions of novelty and compositionality reflect the claim that “a 
minimum of the sentences that we utter is learnt by heart as such (…) most of 
them, on the contrary, are composed on the spur of the moment” (Paul 1886: 97–
98, quoted in Chomsky 2012). The central assumption behind the constructs of 
formulaicity and prefabrication is that, rather than starting from scratch every time 
a communicator wishes to use language, he or she takes advantage of what Becker 
(1975: 17) calls “ready-made frameworks on which to hang the expression of our 
ideas” or what Bolinger (1976: 1) refers to as “prefabs”. 
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Significantly, developments in linguistic research have led to “the increasing 
recognition of the extent to which our potential to produce ‘novel language’ is re-
stricted by our preference for ‘prefabricated language’ at different structural levels 
of language and across the full variety of communicative contexts, registers and 
modes of expression” (Pęzik 2018: 19). That crucially corresponds with Wray’s 
observation that “formulaic language offers processing benefits to speakers and 
hearers, by providing a short cut to production and comprehension” (2009: 213). 
As Wray further remarks: 
One effective tool for drawing others into behaviors beneficial to us is to em-
ploy wordstrings that are in current use in our community. They enable us so-
cially to align ourselves with others (I am like you because I talk like you, so 
you will want to help me), and as a way of minimizing the risk of misunder-
standing, since wordstrings or partly lexicalized frames that have their own 
semantic entry require less decoding (2012: 231–232). 
A kin construct is that of “conventionalisation” which has been studied exten-
sively within the set of theories known as Cognitive Linguistics (Langacker 1987; 
1991; 2017; Talmy 2000; Geeraerts & Cuyckens 2007; Dąbrowska & Divjak 2015; 
Dancygier 2017), where it is often discussed in conjunction with the related notion 
of “entrenchment”. 
Langacker (1987; 2007; 2008) sees conventionalisation as the extent to which a 
structure is cognitively routinised, shared among users, and recognised as having 
such status (Langacker 2007: 425). While conventionalisation is seen as a metric 
applicable to a language community, entrenchment is seen as a matter of individual 
speakers (Langacker 2008). Currently, work is being done that expands our under-
standing of how conventionalisation and entrenchment function (e.g. Blumenthal-
Dramé 2012; Divjak & Caldwell-Harris 2015; Kerremans 2015; Schmid 2015; 
2017). Among others, this work lays strong emphasis on corpus methods, opera-
tionalization, and empirical falsifiability. Let us now present in some detail one 
current perspective, viz. Schmid’s (2015) Entrenchment-and-Conventionalisation 
Model (E-C Model). This proposal is remarkably comprehensive as it integrates 
multidisciplinary insights. 
Schmid’s (2015: 15) model is usage-based and as such largely consistent with 
the works of Bybee (1985; 2006), Barlow & Kemmer (2000), and Tomasello 
(2003). At the same time, the model is inspired by Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 
1987; 2008; 2012), Construction Grammar (Goldberg 1995; Hilpert 2014), and by 
accounts that can be referred to as socio-cognitive (e.g. Kristiansen 2008; Harder 
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plex-adaptive systems (e.g. the Five Graces Group 2009), perspectives from cogni-
tive neuroscience (Pulvermüller 2003; 2013), and earlier-mentioned research on 
formulaicity, to name but a few. The model rests on the following axioms: 
1. Speakers use language in order to communicate.  
2. For speakers to be able to do so, they need linguistic knowledge.  
3. Linguistic knowledge is represented in individual language users’ minds and 
brains.  
4. Members of a speech community share linguistic knowledge.  
5. No two members of a speech community have identical linguistic knowledge.  
6. Individual and shared linguistic knowledge are both stable and subject to 
change.  
7. Linguistic structure is shaped by language use. 
Critically, for the E-C Model to be regarded valid, all the axioms have to be held 
valid. While this may be a reasonable assumption for most of the axioms, it is not 
the case with all of them, especially the axiom about the close link between lan-
guage structure and use, as Schmid (2015: 1) points out. The model’s key elements 
are usage, entrenchment, and conventionalisation with the latter two and the first 
one being in a relation of mutual influence. Schmid (2015: 6) defines conventional-
isation as “continuous mutual coordination and matching of communicative 
knowledge and practices, subject to the exigencies of the entrenchment processes 
taking place in individual minds” and it includes mechanisms like “innovation”, 
“co-adaptation”, “diffusion”, and “normation”. Entrenchment is defined as “con-
tinuous routinization and re-organization of associations, depending on exposure to 
and frequency of identical or similar processing events, subject to the exigencies of 
the social environment” (Schmid 2015: 5) and it subsumes a set of three mecha-
nisms: “association”, “routinization”, and “schematization”. While linked by the 
construct of “usage”, the main discerning feature of entrenchment and convention-
alisation is that the former is a matter of (individual) cognitive processes, i.e. it op-
erates in the minds of speakers and is, therefore, psychological, while the latter re-
lies on (collective) sociopragmatic processes, i.e. it operates in communities and is, 
therefore, social (Schmid 2015: 6, 10). What is more, “entrenchment operates over 
patterns of associations and the activities involved in usage” while “conventionali-
zation operates over utterance types” (Schmid 2015: 11). 
Taking this intralingual account as a starting point, Deckert (2015: 30) proposes 
“a cross-systemic elaboration of conventionalisation”, whereby structures are 
mapped between the source and target languages, conditioning what can be called 
the “automated interlingual mapping effect” found in trainee translators. The effect, 
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further outlined within the dual-process theories with evidence from written and 
audiovisual translation (Deckert 2016; 2017a; 2017b), consists in the activation of 
some target text variants as automatic (cf. Jääskeläinen & Tirkkonen-Condit 1991; 
Dragsted 2004; Tirkkonen-Condit 2005; Hvelplund 2011; 2016), uncontrolled, and 
fast, whereby other variants can be available but retrievable only upon switching to 
Type 2 processing. 
It should be pointed out that what dual-process theories refer to as “automatic” 
or Type 1 processes, share features with the construct of “literal translation”, or 
more appropriately and recently “default translation” (Carl & Dragsted 2012; Hal-
verson 2015), or “unchallenged translation” (Carl & Dragsted 2012), as opposed to 
its “challenged” counterpart. In this vein, Halverson (2017a: 206–207) rightly notes 
that a relevant construct is “word translation perplexity” put forward by Carl et al. 
(2016) and defined as “how many translation choices a translator has at a given 
point of the source text, i.e. how many equally likely words can be produced for a 
source word in a given context (Carl et al. 2016: 29). The argument is that having a 
very small number of choices will be conducive to “automaticity”. 
The notion of “literal translation” or the “literal translation hypothesis” can be 
traced back to Ivir (1981) as well as Toury (1995) and is an important element of 
the monitor model (Ivir 1981; Toury 1995; Tirkkonen-Condit 2005; Tirkkonen-
Condit; Mäkisalo & Immonen 2008). The model tackles aspects of automaticity in 
translatorial decisions and sees literal translation as produced first, to be then re-
vised, if need be, according to the monitor, which alerts the translator. These postu-
lates were revisited in Schaeffer & Carl’s (2013) translation priming study. The au-
thors drew on the distinction between vertical and horizontal translation (de Groot 
1997) and discerned two modes that can be cognitively engaged in, even though 
the modes do not necessarily need to be used consecutively in all translation tasks. 
First, “an automatic translation procedure produces default translations on the basis 
of shared representations (horizontal translation)” (Schaeffer & Carl 2013: 186). 
Then, the authors go on to explain, this “regeneration on the basis of shared repre-
sentations” continues under the condition that “the target text being produced con-
forms to the target norms and contextual considerations of the vertical processes”. 
However, “when the target text is not acceptable, the interim translation, either kept 
in working memory or already partially produced as target text, is adapted to target 
norms by vertical encoding processes” (Schaeffer & Carl 2013: 185). The authors 
point out that their model has much in common with the one developed by Chris-
toffels & de Groot (2005). A significant difference is that de Groot (2011) argues 
for separate input and output lexicons for the source and target languages while 





Translatorial and non-translatorial automaticity: An integrative account 
the horizontal processes, rather than positing a total of four lexicons. 
The idea that translation can involve two stages is also voiced by Hansen (2003: 
27), who observes that “(…) translators sometimes translate “automatically”; they 
feel a kind of “flow” and become aware of a poor translation at once, enabling 
them to find better solutions without great effort.” Vitally, however, as argued in 
Deckert (2015; 2016; 2017a; 2017b), in a subset of cases the intervention from 
non-automatic processes might not take place even if the automatic variant is not 
acceptable. Nonetheless, this does not entail that the proposals are incongruent. Ra-
ther, a distinction should be introduced between three broad types of scenarios. The 
first scenario, arguably the most common one, is where the translator operates au-
tomatically without detriment to translation acceptability. The second scenario is 
where the translator operates automatically, realises the automatic target variant is 
not acceptable, and revises the original decision. The third scenario, the one ad-
dressed in the present study, is where the translator operates in the automatic mode, 
produces a target text that is unacceptable, and possibly fails to recognize the issue. 
In addition to offering new experimental evidence of translatorial automaticity, the 
study reported in the following sections also positions translatorial automaticity 
against cognitive automaticity in the non-translatorial sense. 
3. The study 
3.1. Procedure, subjects, and materials 
Explorations of the translator’s cognitive operations – the pivot of this contribution 
– are salient in a dynamic research programme within Translation Studies known 
as “translation process research” (or “TPR”) (e.g. Muñoz 2016; Whyatt 2016; 
Lacruz & Jääskeläinen 2018, to name but a few of the recent publications). The 
translation process can be examined by methods roughly divided into product- and 
process-oriented. This distinction (e.g. Angelone 2018) is meant to discern methods 
that attempt to examine the process of target text production, for instance by moni-
toring the translator’s gaze or keyboard activity, from those that examine the target 
text itself. 
The first part of this study, which deals with translation, is product-based. An 
analogous method is then applied in the second part, which looks into non-
translational data. A total of 55 subjects took part (14 male, 40 female;3 mean age 
21.12,4 SD = 0.68). They completed three tasks, two of which featured experi-
                                                 
3 One subject did not provide gender information. 
4 In three cases age was not stated. 
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mental stimuli discussed in this paper.5 As presented in Table 1 and Table 4, the 
stimuli were English sentences to be translated into Polish (Task 1) and puzzle-
based questions to be answered (Task 2). Subjects were all final-year BA students 
and translation trainees, native speakers of Polish, with a proficient command of 
English (C2 according to the CEFR6). They were tested in four small groups, 
providing their answers individually on paper forms. Subjects who declared that 
they had seen one or more of the puzzles used in Task 2 (see Table 4) were exclud-
ed from the analysis since their prior knowledge of the puzzles and correct an-
swer(s) would have affected our results. Additionally, those subjects would recog-
nize the purpose of the task, i.e. that the items were designed to elicit an intuitive 
incorrect answer, which would condition their responses in both Task 1 and Task 2. 
The results obtained from Task 1 were then supplemented with data from a post-
experimental questionnaire that was used to fine-tune the observations about the 
translator’s automatic decisions. Finally, post-test debriefing discussions were 
held7 enabling subjects to give their feedback once they knew the purpose of the 
test.  
3.2. Translatorial automaticity: Task 1 
Task 1 comprised a total of six English sentences. Subjects were instructed to ren-
der them into Polish, their mother tongue. Each of the experimental stimuli fea-
tured what can be termed a “trigger of automaticity” and they were interspersed 
with filler stimuli, as displayed in Table 1. 
The expressions hypothesized to work as triggers of automaticity in stimuli 2, 4 
and 5 draw on those used in the study reported by Deckert (2017) and they rely on 
“asymmetric interlingual structuring of content”. What we mean by this is that the 
source structure is underspecified with respect to some feature that the target lan-
guage conventionally codes. Importantly, the stimuli were designed in such a way 
as to make the feature hard to infer from contextual or co-textual evidence. In the 
case of professor, the gender was not clear from the English sentence. In the case 
of friend, the subjects could not infer either the gender of the individual or the de-
gree of emotional closeness between the speaker and “the friend”. 
                                                 
5 The third task asked subjects to read a short text in English together with its Polish translation and 
to then express their opinion by answering seven questions. This task was administered between the 
ones discussed here, but is not relevant to the present analysis as the type of activity was different.  
6 The Common European Framework of Reference for Languages: Learning, Teaching, Assess-
ment. 
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What those teenagers wanted 
to do was to reinvent them-
selves. 
filler n/a n/a 
2. 
Professor Smith visited Po-
land last month to give a se-





That new film is hardly a 
masterpiece. 
filler n/a n/a 
4. 
My friend succeeded in 









Mary was slowly approach-





‘bank as a finan-
cial institution’ 
6. 
The company was eventually 




billion bilion ‘trillion’ 
The degree of closeness is conventionally contrasted lexically in Polish, e.g. by 
znajomy (‘an acquaintance’) and przyjaciel (‘a close friend’). While English also 
has separate lexical items for these two “prototypes”, it is our contention that in 
Polish it is harder to remain vague about the degree of closeness by not selecting 
the appropriate lexical variant. In the case of bank we are dealing with homonymy. 
Finally, stimulus 6 is different from the remaining three stimuli in that it features a 
“false friend”. English billion canonically stands for ‘1 000 000 000’, the number 
which is coded in Polish as miliard. The Polish word bilion, in turn, stands for ‘1 
000 000 000 000’. 
The assumption guiding this study is that while the number of target text candi-
dates may be more than one, there invariably is a candidate whose selection is the 
result of automated Type 1 decision-making. More empirical work is needed to 
disentangle the historical, social, and psychological factors that may explain why 
some ST–TT pairings are more automated than others, but a working hypothesis is 
that these pairings are formed, at least in some part, by repeated exposition and use, 
which links the discussion back to the notions of entrenchment and conventionali-
sation (see Section 2.2). Such an explanation is consistent with Halverson’s (2003; 
2010) postulates on the role of entrenchment, and particularly her observation that 
“the existence of highly entrenched translation pairs will impact the likelihood of 
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selecting a particular target language option” (Halverson 2017a: 207; 2017b). The 
explanation also fits with the default translation hypothesis which “suggests that 
entrenchment effects strengthen the coactivation of linguistic patterns and thus re-
duce the cognitive load during translation” (Hansen-Schirra 2017: 238). Clearly, 
effort reduction is an essential principle guiding human mental activity, and the ar-
gument voiced, among others, by dual-process theorists that humans tend to act as 
“cognitive misers” (Stanovich 2009) can account for a fair portion of their errone-
ous judgments (Toplak et al. 2011). In other words, “this strong bias to default to 
the simplest cognitive mechanism – to be a cognitive miser – means that humans 
are often less than rational” (Toplak et al. 2014: 148). 
In the case of stimuli 2 and 4, the automated variants code “maleness” and in the 
case of stimulus 4 the additional component is that of “emotional closeness” ex-
pressed with the lexeme przyjaciel. For stimulus 5, the reflexive translation – in all 
likelihood resulting from formal resemblance – will be bank ‘the financial institu-
tion’. A similar type of motivation is hypothesised to prompt the activation of bil-
ion as translation of stimulus 6 (cf. Schaeffer et al. 2016). 
As the subjects’ task was to provide their translation in the designated slots, for 
each of the six source sentences an additional slot was provided, where subjects 
could include any comments they might have had about the task and stimulus at 
hand. To ensure that subjects actually considered providing their feedback at this 
stage, they were instructed to even explicitly state if they had no comments regard-
ing any of the six sentences, by writing “none”. 
Results: Task 1 
The results on Task 1 are reported at two levels. First, our group-level results indi-
cate how many of the four experimental stimuli were translated in the automatic 
mode (Table 2). Then, the results obtained from each stimulus are analysed indi-
vidually (Table 3). The analysis of individual results may reveal differences in the 
responses to particular stimuli, and this needs to be kept in mind when drawing 
conclusions. The measure used to report group-level results will be referred to as 
the “index of translatorial automaticity” (i.e. the TA index). Index level “4” indi-
cates that a subject resorted to automatic translation in the case of all four stimuli. 
However, since stimulus 4 could trigger an automatic response to two properties 
(gender and closeness), subjects could score 0, 0.5, or 1 depending on whether they 
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of subjects  
%  
of subjects 
0 0 0 
1 0 0 
1.5 1 1.8 
2 8 14.5 
2.5 5 9.1 
3 26 47.3 
3.5 3 5.5 
4 12 21.8 
This discrete numerical scoring system is adapted from experimental psychological 
studies into automaticity but it should be borne in mind that ascribing uniform 
weights to individual test items is a simplification serving the practical purpose of 
measuring and comparing results, in our case, between Task 1 and Task 2. 
As can be seen in Table 2, in the pool of 55 subjects, the TA index ranges from 
1.5 to 4, with a variance of 0.98. The minimum score of 1.5 was found in only one 
subject (1.8%). The maximum index score was found in as many as 12 subjects 
(21.8%). The mean TA index is 3.03. 
Now, let us look into automaticity scores as found in each of the four experi-
mental stimuli, presented in Table 3. As was mentioned earlier in this section, the 
last experimental stimulus (billion) drew on a different mechanism than the remain-
ing three stimuli, and this could explain the relatively low proportion of automated 
translations in the case of billion, compared to professor, friend, and bank.  
Table 3. Translatorial automaticity across stimuli 
Automaticity  
trigger 
Total no. of 
translations 





professor 55 55 100 





bank 55 48 87.3 
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The latter three stimuli were translated rather consistently in what we argue to be 
the automatic mode. But the level of consistency – and arguably automaticity – is 
most remarkable in the case of professor, where all the subjects translated with the 
masculine form. This finding dovetails with the result reported in Deckert (2017: 
477–478), where the same proportion of trainee translators unreflectively rendered 
prime minister into Polish by linguistically coding masculinity.8 
 We also found that the triggers of automaticity received different amounts of at-
tention, as reflected in the comments provided by our subjects. For instance, as 
many as eight subjects offered feedback on stimulus 5 (bank), stating that, given 
the scarcity of contextual clues, they were in two minds about the optimal target 
variant. Interestingly, some other, irrelevant elements of the source sentences were 
commented on too. Subjects expressed their doubts as to whether to retain the 
names Mary and Smith or to change them to Maria or Kowalski (a proverbial 
Polish surname). One subject pointed out that the adverb eventually (stimulus 6) 
could likely be mistranslated, which is a valid point given the word’s formal simi-
larity to the Polish word ewentualnie ‘after all’. Other comments mentioned some 
further translation hurdles, viz. elements like a series of lectures, Stanford (‘city’ or 
‘university’) and PhD. This gives us some insight into the subjects’ decisions and – 
vitally for the current investigation – indicates that they did engage in reflective 
processing, even if it may not have been sufficient to override their susceptibility to 
automaticity. 
It is critical to note that not a single person commented on the problem of re-
solving the gender ambiguity in stimulus 2 (professor), while a very analogous 
problem in stimulus 4 (friend) was identified and translated non-automatically a 
number of times. This – together with the uniformly “masculine” form of the trans-
lation equivalent of this stimulus – could imply that in the case of professor the cul-
tural stereotype is particularly strong. Interestingly, it also shows that triggers that 
are typologically similar, viz. in this case those that rely on textual underspecifica-
tion and ambiguity, can be functionally very different. 
To further test the evidence of automaticity obtained in Task 1, we set out to 
check whether in the case of stimuli 2, 4 and 5 we could be dealing with a situation 
where subjects had conscious access to more than one variant when producing their 
translations – but nonetheless unanimously opted for one of them. We ran a study 
which replicated the procedure used in the main study but was additionally fol-
                                                 
8 In the case of prime minister gender is inferred from the Polish verb used with the Polish noun 
premier more than from the noun itself which would need to be coupled with pani (mrs./ms.), as in 
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lowed by a post-experimental questionnaire. The questionnaire contained the for-
merly used stimuli but they were altered by underlining the hypothesised triggers 
of automaticity presented in Table 1. A pool of 18 BA students participated (6 male 
and 12 female, mean age = 21.28, SD = 1.07). These subjects were explicitly asked 
whether they had considered “any other translation of the underlined words” than 
the ones they had providedearlier. Space was allotted under each stimulus for sub-
jects to state what that other variant had been or to write “no”. The findings are 
presented in Table 4 below. As could be expected, our follow-up questionnaire al-
lowed us to collect a larger number of relevant9 comments than was possible from 
the comments section in the translation test itself. 
Table 4. The number of comments provided in the main task and in the questionnaire, as 












professor 18 18 0 0 









3 1 10 13 
bank 17 15 0 9 
In the case of friend and bank, the number of relevant comments increased respec-
tively from 4 to 2310 and from 0 to 9, when the questionnaire was incorporated. 
This shows that for some subjects the questionnaire indeed prompted a Type-1-to-
Type-2 processing switch. However, even this extent of deliberative cognitive pro-
cessing is arguably low. More importantly, it has been induced artificially by the 
experimenter after the translation had already been completed and as such cannot 
be considered as evidence of non-automaticity taking place in the course of transla-
tion itself. In the case of gender and closeness in friend, 44.4% and 27.8% of sub-
jects still did not manage to identify the problems. In the case of bank this group is 
as large as 47.1%. 
Very importantly, the increase in the amount of subject feedback is not uniform 
across automaticity triggers. In the case of gender in professor, the exceptionally 
                                                 
9 By “relevant” comments, we mean those directly related to triggers of automaticity. Therefore, 
whenever subjects stated they had no comments, or provided comments on non-targeted aspects of 
the stimulus, the responses were seen as indicative of automaticity. 
10 I should be mentioned that only five subjects commented on the problem with both the “gender” 
and “closeness” facets of the stimulus friend. 
 
 
               
20.1 (2019): 85-118 
99
strong entrenchment of the interlingual mapping is corroborated as none of the 18 
subjects who provided the masculine target variant expressed any doubt about that 
decision – neither in the “comments” space under their translation nor in the post-
experimental questionnaire. This is remarkable because – here and with the other 
triggers – it is plausible that, when responding to the post-experimental question-
naire, subjects may not have just been reflecting back on their past decision-
making. Rather, whether intentionally or not, they may have been zooming in on 
the underlined elements and trying to come up with new variants, i.e. other than the 
ones they had already given. If that is the case, instances where no alternative trans-
lation was given in either the main task (as part of the target text or in the space 
provided for comments) or in the post-experimental questionnaire, constitute strong 
evidence of automaticity. This is consistent with Kahneman’s (2011: 80) convic-
tion that in the reflexive mode of processing we do not keep track of any other de-
cision options than the one we are opting for (cf. Section 2.1). 
To better contextualise the assumptions, procedure, and results reported so far, 
and before we move on to presenting the results of Task 2, let us digress and exam-
ine briefly the logic and implications of an analogous non-translational reasoning 
task. As a starting point, recall that Type 1 processes are characterized by high 
speed, little effort, and no control. One way to tap into such processes is to use 
question-answer formats (cf. also Task 2 below) that include questions like “What 
colour is milk?”. In most standard communicative contexts, the answer will auto-
matically present itself to the respondent. That is to say, the individual will not 
need to invest much time or effort, or exert control over his or her cognitive opera-
tions to deliver the answer “white”. This can be compared against the kind of pro-
cessing necessary to arrive at the answer to “How much is 43 x 21?” Here, Type 1 
processing will most likely provide no answer; rather, a series of steps will need to 
be taken in a controlled and more effortful procedure, i.e. Type 2 processing will be 
engaged.  
The operations involved in completing the two tasks reported on in this study 
are a special case of Type 1 operations. These kind of operations could be triggered 
by a question like “What do cows drink?”. For many, if not most, individuals, an 
answer presents itself as readily as in the case of the question “What colour is 
milk?”. But the critical difference is that the “ready” answer to “What do cows 
drink?” – arguably “milk” – is not correct. At the same time, the other essential 
point is that even though “milk” is activated as the answer, the respondent surely 
knows that this answer is incorrect. By “know” we mean that this information is 
stored in the individual’s long-term memory as part of their knowledge, and not 
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vital because the question we are dealing with here is not so much whether or not 
the automatic answer is initially activated, but whether the respondent ultimately 
decides to give the answer “milk”, possibly after some deliberation. This is where 
methodological considerations have to be factored in; it matters, for example, 
whether the question is asked in writing or in a face-to-face exchange, if only be-
cause different amounts of time are available to produce an answer (cf. Finucane et 
al. 2000). In that sense it could be expected that an individual is more likely to say 
“milk” if the question is posed orally.  
As argued earlier, in this study the assumption of automatic processing follows 
from our observation that subjects tended to stick with the answers they first pro-
vided despite a range of factors and prompts such as the following: the stimuli were 
short, which should have made it easier to identify the problematic elements, the 
stimuli were provided in writing, the subjects were asked to comment on potential 
issues with the stimuli, and finally, in the post-experimental questionnaire, they 
were explicitly asked about any other translation variants they might have consid-
ered for what we postulated to be the triggers of automaticity. Returning to the milk 
analogy, individuals may well be expected to answer “milk” if the question “What 
do cows drink?” were asked by an experimenter in a face-to-face interview. How-
ever, we would expect fewer individuals to answer “milk” if they were answering 
in writing. Even fewer individuals would stick to that answer if they were asked 
about whether they thought there was anything problematic about the question, not 
to mention if they got yet another chance to realise that the original answer was not 
the right one; that is, if – with the words “cow” and “drink” now underlined – they 
were asked again whether they had considered any other answers. It would be very 
surprising if, with all these chances for reconsideration and repair, not a single per-
son switched to the answer “water” or at least signalled that “milk”, although it 
came to mind first, was not the correct answer. It would be also be curious, and in-
dicative of automaticity in the processing of the concepts “cows” and “drinking”, if 
individuals provided comments on other aspects of the question, for instance about 
different breeds of cattle possibly having different habits. 
Therefore, when in our study the original answer provided by the subject was re-
tained, and remained unfurnished with any relevant commentary, this was inter-
preted as evidence of automaticity. The argument we advance is that, e.g. the pair-
ing of professor and ‘male professor’ is so entrenched that even after being 
prompted to allocate additional attentional resources, the subjects may still not be 
able to identify the problem. 
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3.3. Non-translatorial automaticity: Task 2 
Task 2, designed to address the question of non-translatorial automaticity, was 
based on the Cognitive Reflection Test 2 (CRT-2), developed by Thomson & Op-
penheimer (2016). The CRT-2 builds on the first 3-item version of the CRT (Fred-
erick 2005), mentioned in Section 2.1, which has been shown to work as a diagnos-
tic of bias susceptibility, moral judgments, and belief in God, among others (cf. e.g. 
Oechssler et al. 2009; Toplak et al. 2011; Shenhav et al. 2011; Paxton et al. 2012; 
Pennycook et. al. 2014; Baron et al. 2015). The CRT comprises the following ques-
tion items, which are expected to trigger incorrect automatic responses: 
(1) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How 
much does the ball cost? _____ cents 
(2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 ma-
chines to make 100 widgets? _____ minutes 
(3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 
48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to 
cover half of the lake? _____ days 
Given CRT’s mathematical orientation, the use of the follow-up version (CRT-2) is 
advantageous since it does not conflate cognitive reflection and numeracy. Also, 
using the CRT-2 minimises the risk of subjects’ prior exposure to the question 
items, which is an increasingly frequent problem with the CRT. Nonetheless, some 
subjects reported they had been exposed to CRT-2 and were therefore excluded 
from the analysis, as explained in Section 3.1. The CRT-2, administered as Task 2, 
features the following questions as triggers of automatic incorrect responses (Table 
5).  







If you’re running a race and you pass the person in 
second place, what place are you in? 
1 2 
2 
A farmer had 15 sheep and all but 8 died. How 
many are left? 
7 8 
3 
Emily’s father has three daughters. The first two 




How many cubic centimetres of dirt are there in a 
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Analogously to the stimuli in Task 1, for respondents to come up with the correct 
answer they need to switch to the deliberative mode of thinking. 
Results: Task 2 (CRT-2) 
Drawing on the logic of the TA index as proposed for Task 1, we will discuss the 
findings of Task 2 by using an analogous measure, i.e. the “non-translatorial auto-
maticity” (NTA) index. The values of the index vary from 0 (no automatic respons-
es) to 4 (all responses automatic), with a variance of 1.03. Notably, Table 6 shows 
that every possible score was found in the results. It is even more interesting to 
note that as many as 14 subjects (25.5 %) scored 0, which means they did not settle 
for the automatic answer in any of the four questions. On the other hand, only three 
subjects (5.5 %) reached an index score of 4, meaning they provided intuitive an-
swers to all four items. The mean NTA index is 1.16. 




of subjects  
%  
of subjects 
0 14 25.5 
1 25 45.5 
2 12 21.8 
3 1 1.8 
4 3 5.5 
Finally, we obtained additional feedback from subjects on both Task 1 and Task 2 
in debriefing discussions held immediately after the test sessions. As the subjects 
and the experimenter went over the stimuli one by one, the subjects expressed sur-
prise that they had failed to spot the “obvious problems”. They reacted with incre-
dulity to how they had made some of their decisions unreflectively. While not 
quantifiable, this relatively unmediated subject input is very valuable as it sheds 
more light on the questions addressed in this paper. 
3.4. Translatorial and non-translatorial automaticity 
Let us summarise the results of Task 1 and Task 2. The variance in TA and NTA 
indices is comparable, with 0.98 in the former and 1.03 in the latter. However, 
there are major divergences to be highlighted, surfacing in the index values across 
Task 1 and Task 2. First, differences are expressed in the ratios of maxi-
mum/minimum scores. In Task 1 the maximum index is found in 21.8% of subjects 
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while in Task 2 it is found in 5.5%. Even more strikingly, while the minimum in-
dex score is found in a total of 25.5% of respondents in Task 2, in Task 1 there are 
no subjects with an index score of 0 (or 0.5 or 1). In that group, the lowest value is 
1.5 and it is found in only one subject, with a further group of eight subjects 
(14.5%) reaching the index score 2. The discrepancy is corroborated by the com-












Figure 1. Translatorial and non-translatorial index values across the subject pool 
The difference between Task 1 (M = 3.03, SD = 0.99) and Task 2 (M = 1.16, SD = 
1.01) is statistically significant, as confirmed by a two-tailed Student T-Test, t(109) 
= 11.26164, p < .00001. The differences are also illustrated in Figure 1 above. 
The central question is whether there is a correlation between the strength of au-
tomaticity in translatorial and non-translatorial decision-making. As the data do not 
follow a normal distribution, we computed the Spearman’s rank correlation coeffi-
cient and established only negligible correlation, rs(53) = 0.12, N = 110, p = .35. 
This indicates that there is no evidence of TA and NTA indices being associated. 
4. Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to look into translatorial automaticity and relate it to 
non-translatorial automaticity, as these operate in a subset of decision-making con-
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methodological considerations addressed further in this section, and the qualitative 
differences between Task 1 and Task 2 (by their very nature they use different 
types of stimuli), the findings can be interpreted as initial evidence that translatorial 
automaticity and automaticity in non-translational tasks might not overlap. More 
work is needed to further test the claim, especially given that – to the best of the au-
thor’s knowledge – no studies focused on the relationship before. 
 By extension, the results could be taken as some indication that translation is a 
special type of cognitive activity. One important determinant of this “special” sta-
tus could be that our subjects were translation trainees. Interestingly, rather than 
weakening the strength of automaticity in translatorial activity, their translation ex-
perience, or perhaps more precisely the awareness of having some experience and 
having developed some competence, could be increasing the subjects’ confidence 
levels, which in turn could result in partial desensitisation to inconspicuous transla-
tion problems. The notable aspect here seems to be the “inconspicuousness” or lack 
of “ostensiveness” of automaticity triggers in Task 1, which constitutes a challenge. 
What we mean by this is that automaticity was triggered by very basic source text 
elements,11 ones which the students took for granted, if only because they did not 
have to look them up. The problem ties to that of “pre-choice behaviour” discussed 
by Wilss (1994), where the focus should ideally be on both “determining when and 
how to decide” (Wilss 1994: 148). 
From the didactic angle, referring to the work by Chesterman (1997), PACTE 
(2003; 2014; 2015), Shreve (2006) as well as Alves & Gonçalves (2007), Alves & 
Hurtado (2017: 541) offer a definition of translation competence as “a cyclical pro-
cess from an initial kind of novice behavior to a stage of consolidation of compe-
tences, geared by a process of gradual automatization as proceduralization occurs”. 
On this account, Type 1 translator behaviour is framed positively as an index of 
proficiency and experience (cf. Krings 1986; Jääskeläinen & Tirkkonen-Condit 
1991; Pym 2011). Likewise, Kiraly (1995: 68) observes that “to the extent that the 
skills are well-mastered and permanent, information processing can be said to be 
automatic” and Delisle (1984: 82, as quoted in Kiraly (1995)), talks about situa-
tions where “the discovery of an equivalent does occur more or less spontaneously. 
During these moments of inspiration, the linking of concepts is instantaneous. It re-
sults from perfect comprehension of the ideas to be rendered and the direct availa-
bility of the linguistic means to express them”. 
                                                 
11 That is to say, it is unlikely that our subjects did not know that professor is dual gender or that 
they were unable to encode either of these gender variants in the target language. 
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Indeed, on the whole, if one had to say if automaticity – either translatorial or 
non-translatorial – is desirable or not, the answer would in all likelihood be posi-
tive. This, however, should not let us underappreciate the fact that Type 1 pro-
cessing can result in deficient decisions (cf. Ivanova 1998). Pertinently, a line of 
thinking which has to be considered as a source of such suboptimal Type 1 choices 
in translation, and an area where special trainee sensitisation is therefore necessary, 
is what Mossop (1983) calls “automatic correspondence”. It hinges on the miscon-
ception that linguistic systems relate to one another in a straightforward fashion, 
which in turn – as Mossop (1983: 273–277) argues – is shaped by second language 
learning, bilingual dictionaries/terminology banks, as well as machine translation. 
That automatic processes in professionals can lead to inferior translation quality is 
also brought up by Jääskeläinen (2010).  
If translation expertise is conceived of as “an increased capacity to recognize 
translation problems and an increased ability to effectively resolve problems of 
transfer by applying schematized knowledge and proceduralized problem resolu-
tion methods” (Shreve & Lacruz 2017: 129), then a skill associated with the 
“recognition” capacity would be to monitor the very process and transition from 
automatic to non-automatic cognition where the former is likely to result in defi-
ciencies. 
Such a component can be identified in PACTE’s (2003: 59) strategic sub-
competence,12 most easily in (2) and (4) below: 
(1) to plan the process and carry out the translation project (choice of the most 
adequate method); (2) to evaluate the process and the partial results obtained 
in relation to the final purpose; (3) to activate the different sub-competencies 
and compensate for deficiencies in them; (4) to identify translation problems 
and apply procedures to solve them. 
A kin skill is signalled by Hansen (2003: 29), who talks about the translators’ 
“ability to spot and solve translation problems, and their ability to evaluate their 
tentative translation elements and their target texts”. 
                                                 
12 It could be noted, however, that PACTE’s (2018) account comprises a set of five competences: 
language competence; cultural, world knowledge and thematic competence; instrumental compe-
tence; translation service provision competence; and translation problem solving competence. Per-
haps partly because, as the PACTE group emphasize, the competences cannot be construed as dis-
crete, it could be more difficult to discern the skill approximating that of managing the translator’s 
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The proposals surveyed above – together with the current study – highlight the 
interplay of the translator’s reflexive and reflective processes. That interplay has 
theoretical as well practical implications for the understanding of translatorial ac-
tivity. As a bottom line, it will be a desirable skill of an expert translator to opti-
mally coordinate automatic and non-automatic cognitive operations. Such coordi-
nation will be conducive to the translator’s productivity, on the one hand, and to 
translation quality assurance, on the other. It should, therefore, receive due atten-
tion early in the translator training process. 
On a methodological note, as was hinted at earlier in the paper, we should keep 
it in mind that results will be differently generalisable depending on the actual 
choice of experimental stimuli. As far as Task 1 goes, given the typological differ-
ences among stimuli and their varying automaticity-triggering potential, further ex-
periments could test subjects using more stimuli of each type. This would make it 
possible to arrive at a more fine-grained picture of the factors that motivate transla-
torial automaticity. In this study, the number of stimuli was determined by the need 
to keep Task 1 analogous to the Task 2, which used an existing test. A methodolog-
ical concern to keep in mind here, and applies more generally to experimental tasks 
of this type, is that a larger number of stimuli, even if interspersed with fillers, in-
creases the likelihood that subjects would identify the purpose of the task. A simi-
lar risk would exist if the number of stimuli remained fairly small, but the stimuli 
were only of one type (e.g. only false friends). 
The product-based method, used is this study, has one main advantage over the 
more process-based ones, which constitute a natural alternative. With a product-
based approach, the study’s ecological validity is increased because the approach 
engages subjects in a task that approximates rather closely the actual translation 
tasks they are used to performing. While using process-oriented methods has im-
portant advantages, above all relative directness, the offset is that subjects are 
aware of being closely monitored, which has some influence on their performance. 
The aspect of performance that the current study is crucially interested in is control 
– since lack of control is a constituent of automaticity. Therefore, using a product-
based method made it possible to minimize the effect of experimental procedure on 
the subjects’ control and thus help prevent these effects from distorting the results. 
This is similar to the “white coat effect”, originally identified in medicine (Picker-
ing et al. 1988; Banegas et al. 2018), where elevated blood pressures are observed 
in patients if measurements are made in a medical setting. Similarly, Stanovich 
(2009: 66) makes the point that in a situation like test-taking, participants are “spe-
cifically cued to avoid minimal information processing” – which is associated with 
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automaticity, and therefore errors of reasoning are less likely to occur in such situa-
tions than ordinarily. 
Another advantage of the approach illustrated in this paper is that it is compara-
tively easy to replicate. It avoids some of the problems of using eye-tracking meth-
odologies (cf. O’Brien 2009), specifically, the need to have access to sophisticated 
equipment, and related issues of cost, rapid technological redundancy, or a steep 
learning curve (O’Brien 2009: 252–253). This, of course, does not minimise the 
importance of using sophisticated process-based method to gain further insight into 
translatorial automaticity. Despite the advantages of the product-based method, we 
should be careful not to over-interpret the identified problem-solving patterns. In 
our study, the main methodological caveat is that we base our conclusions on indi-
rect evidence; viz. we reason about the subjects’ cognitive processes based on the 
texts the subjects produce. Given that some indirectness between data and phenom-
ena has to be factored in, irrespective of the method used, and that each methodo-
logical approach sheds light on the problem under scrutiny from a different angle, a 
way forward would be to triangulate methods. A further step would therefore be to 
tap the potential of eye-tracking, key-logging, and reaction time testing, as a desir-
able complement to the method demonstrated in this study. 
5. Concluding remarks 
Evans and Stanovich (2013: 223) argue for a dual-processing account where “rapid 
autonomous processes (Type 1) are assumed to yield default responses unless in-
tervened on by distinctive higher order reasoning processes (Type 2)”. As the find-
ings discussed above show, the intervention from Type 2 processes might be hard 
to induce, for instance in the case of strongly conventionalised interlingual map-
pings, which is in accord with earlier results (Deckert 2015; 2016; 2017a; 2017b). 
When it comes to the paper’s objective of positioning automaticity of translato-
rial and non-translational decisions against each other (TA index and NTA index), 
we detected patterns demonstrating that in translation trainees translatorial automa-
ticity could be harder to override than non-translatorial automaticity. This holds 
implications of didactic nature, highlighting the role of the trainer and course de-
sign in sensitising novice translators to the types of scenarios conducive to subop-
timal Type 1 decision-making.  
Also, no sufficient evidence has been found to argue that an individual’s pro-
pensity to make automatic decisions in translation is positively or negatively corre-





Translatorial and non-translatorial automaticity: An integrative account 
opens an interesting avenue of research to ascertain in what respects and to what 
extent translatorial cognition is commensurate with cognition across other domains 
of decision-making. 
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TRANSLATORISCHE UND AUßERTRANSLATORISCHE AUTOMATIZITÄT:  
EINE INTEGRATIVE DARSTELLUNG 
 
Zweck dieser Abhandlung ist die empirische Untersuchung einer Teilmenge kognitiver 
Prozesse bei Übersetzern in der Ausbildung mit dem Ziel, einen Einblick in deren Ent-
scheidungsfindung zu gewinnen. Dabei ist insbesondere die Art und Funktion der automa-
tisierten Verarbeitung von Interesse – v. a. wie ausgeprägt diese sein kann und wie sie die 
Qualität von Entscheidungen beeinflusst. Ein weiteres Ziel der Abhandlung ist es, zu einer 
integrativen Sicht auf die Beziehung zwischen translatorischer Automatizität und kogniti-
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Dies könnte zur besseren Erfassung bestimmter Merkmale des Übersetzerverhaltens beitra-
gen und unser Verständnis der Übersetzungskompetenz verbessern. Die in der Abhandlung 
erläuterten Ergebnisse aus Experimenten mit Übersetzern in der Ausbildung weisen auf 
keinen Zusammenhang zwischen den beiden Dimensionen der automatisierten Verarbei-
tung hin und zeigen, dass sich die Ausschaltung der translatorischen Automatizität im Ge-
gensatz zu der Ausschaltung ihres allgemeineren Gegenstücks als schwieriger erweisen 
könnte. 
Schlüsselwörter: sprachübergreifende Übersetzung; Übersetzungskompetenz; Verarbei-
tung bei der Übersetzung; Zwei-Prozess-Theorien; Entscheidungsfindung, Übersetzung 
und Kognition; Übersetzer in der Ausbildung. 
 
